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The central concern of this paper is to respond to the question: why do
FDI inows go where they do in African countries? An understanding of such
factors will assist African policymakers to formulate and execute policies for
attracting FDI. Our estimation results from cross-country regressions for the
period 1996-2008 indicate that: (i) there is a positive relationship between
market size and FDI inows; (ii) openness to trade has a positive impact on
FDI ows; (iii) higher nancial development has negative eect on FDI inows;
(iv) the prevalence of the rule of law increases FDI inows; (v) higher FDI goes
where foreign aid also goes; (vi) agglomeration has a strong positive impact on
FDI inows; (vi) natural resource endowment and exploitation (such as oil) at-
tracts huge FDI; (vii) East and Southern African sub-regions appear positively
disposed to obtain higher levels of inward FDI. The key policy implications
are discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment (FDI), as a key element of the globalization
and of the world economy, is a driver of employment, technological progress,
productivity improvements, and ultimately economic growth. It plays the
critical roles of lling the development, foreign exchange, investment, and
tax revenue gaps in developing countries (Smith, 1997; Quazi, 2007). In
particular, it can play an important role in Africas development eorts,
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including: supplementing domestic savings, employment generation and
growth, integration into the global economy, transfer of modern technolo-
gies, enhancement of eciency, and raising skills of local manpower (Du-
pasquier and Osakwe, 2003; Anyanwu, 2003).
However, Africa has never been a major recipient of FDI ows and so
lags behind other regions of the world. On an annual average basis, the
regions share of global FDI inows was 2.6 percent in the period 1980-89;
1.9 percent in the period 1990-1999; and 3.2 percent in the period 2000-
2009. During the same periods, the Asian region received FDI inows 14.2
percent, 19.1 percent, and 19.1 percent of total global inows, respectively.
One key question is: Why does Africa not attract much FDI? The answer
to this question is important in economics, business, politics, and academia
in the Continent and hence calls for further analysis of the forces driving
FDI.
This paper therefore aims at examining the factors that cause FDI to
go where they do, using evidence from African countries, thus enabling
us to propose some measures for FDI promotion in the Continent. This
is done by means of cross-country regressions for the period 1996-2008.
Thus, the further contents of the paper are as follows. Section 2 presents a
review of recent trend in FDI inows into Africa. Section 3 examines some
theoretical perspectives of the factors driving FDI inows to developing
countries. Section 4 reviews the recent empirical literature while section 5
presents the econometric model, data sources and variable denitions. The
empirical results are presented in section 6, and section 7 summarizes and
concludes the paper with some policy recommendations for increased FDI
inows to Africa.
2. OVERVIEW OF FDI INFLOW TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES
FDI, as an element of the rapid globalization process, has made rapid in-
creases in the last few decades. Global inward FDI ows rose from US$54.1
billion in 1980, reaching US$207.7 billion in 1990 to a peak of US$1,401.5
billion in 2000. A fall ensured from 2001 such that by 2003 it had dipped
to US$565.7 billion before peaking again at US$2100 billion in 2007. Es-
timates for 2009 put the fall to US$1114.2 billion consequent upon the
nancial and economic crisis (Figure 1 and Table 1) (UNCTAD, 2010a).
After almost ten years of growth, FDI inows to Africa fell from a peak
of US$72 billion in 2008 to $59 billion in 2009 | a 19 percent decline
compared to 2008 | due to the nancial and economic crisis (UNCTAD,
2010b). As noted above and as Figure 1 and Table 1 show, Africa has
never been a major recipient of FDI ows and lags behind other regions of
the world. By 1990, Africa's share was a mere 1.37 percent compared to
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Asia received a whopping 27 percent (see Figure 2). Just as FDI inows to
Africa represent a low percentage of the global total, they also represent a
low percentage of its GDP and gross capital formation (Figure 3).
FIG. 1. Trend in FDI Inows (% of GDP) to Developing Regions, 1970-2009
TABLE 1.
FDI Flows by Region, 2007-2009 (US$ Billion and Percent)
FDI inows FDI outows
Region 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
World 2100 1771 1114 2268 1929 1101
Developed economies 1444 1018 566 1924 1572 821
Developing economies 565 630 478 292 296 229
Africa 63 72 59 11 10 5
Latin America and the Caribbean 164 183 117 56 82 47
West Asia 78 90 68 47 38 23
South, East and South-East Asia 259 282 233 178 166 153
South-East Europe and the CIS 91 123 70 52 61 51
Memorandum: percentage share in world FDI ows
Developed economies 68.8 57.5 50.8 84.8 81.5 74.5
Developing economies 26.9 35.6 42.9 12.9 15.4 20.8
Africa 3.0 4.1 5.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 7.8 10.3 10.5 2.5 4.3 4.3
West Asia 3.7 5.1 6.1 2.1 2.0 2.1
South, East and South-East Asia 12.3 15.9 20.9 7.9 8.6 13.9
South-East Europe and CIS 4.3 6.9 6.3 2.3 3.1 4.6
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad-org/fdistatistics)
FDI inows to Africa vary across sub-regions. As Figure 4 illustrates,
Central Africa dominated between 2002 and 2004 but from 2005 to 2008,436 JOHN C. ANYANWU
FIG. 2. Trend in % Share of FDI Inows to Developing Regions, 1970-2009
FIG. 3. Recent Trend in FDI Inows to Africa as % of GDP, Gross Capital Forma-
tion, and Global Total
North Africa was the dominant sub-region. In 2009, all sub-regions expe-
rienced declines though Central Africa took the premier position again.
A major concern regarding FDI inows into the Continent is that the
overwhelming majority of these go into natural resources exploitation. Be-
tween 1998 and 2009, the top ten country recipients are Egypt, South
Africa, Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Congo Republic, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeri-
a, and Chad (Figure 5). Of these top recipient countries, most of the ows
into oil, gas and mining projects. Indeed, the primary sector has been
the largest recipient of accumulated FDI outows to Africa. For example,
the distribution of FDI by industry shows a concentration in the mining
industry in terms of value (Table 2).WHY DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT GO WHERE IT GOES? 437
FIG. 4. Recent Trend in FDI Inows (US$m) to Africa's Sub-Regions, 2000-2009
FIG. 5. Africa's Top Ten Recipients of FDI (US$billion), 1998-2007
3. MAIN FDI DRIVING FACTORS: A THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
A popular conceptualization of, and theoretical framework for, FDI de-
terminants is the \eclectic paradigm" attributed to Dunning (1977, 1993).
It provides a framework that groups micro- and macro-level determinants
in order to analyze why and where multinational companies (MNCs) invest
abroad. The framework posits that rms invest abroad to look for three
types of advantages: Ownership (O), Location (L), and Internalization (I)
advantages; hence it is called the OLI framework. The ownership-specic
advantages (of property rights/patents, expertise and other intangible as-
sets) allow a rm to compete with others in the markets it serves regardless
of the disadvantages of being foreign because it is able to have access to,
and exploit and export natural resources and resource-based products that
are available to it. These advantages may arise from the rm's ability to co-438 JOHN C. ANYANWU
TABLE 2.
Africa's Cross-border M&As by Industry, 2008-2009 (US$ million)
Sales Purchases
Sector/Industry 2008 2009 2008 2009
Total 21193 5140 8216 2702
Primary  2055 2579  33 621
Mining, quarrying and petroleum  2055 2579  133 621
Manufacturing 15639  110 1645 138
Food, beverages and tobacco 39
Textiles, clothing and leather 7
Wood and wood products 11 1082
Publishing and printing  4 14
Chemicals and chemical products 21  620 153
Non-metallic mineral products 15469 250 340  4
Metals and metal products 104 248 102
Services 7609 2672 6704 1942
Trade 37  1
Hotels and restaurants 4  117 3
Transport, storage and communications 1667 3058 4
Finance 6613  295 7037 1643
Business services  157 21
Health and social services 152 5 282
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad-org/fdistatistics)
ordinate complementary activities such as manufacturing and distribution,
and the ability to exploit dierences between countries. The location ad-
vantages are those that make the chosen foreign country a more attractive
site (such as labor advantages, natural resources, trade barriers that restrict
imports, gains in trade costs and strategic advantages through intangible
assets) for FDI than the others hence the reason for the FDI is to supply the
domestic market of the recipient country through an aliate (horizontal F-
DI). The location advantages may arise from dierences in country natural
endowments, government regulations, transport costs, macroeconomic sta-
bility, and cultural factors. Internalization advantages arise from exploiting
imperfections in external markets, including reduction of uncertainty and
transaction costs in order to generate knowledge more eciently as well
as the reduction of state-generated imperfections such as taris, foreign
exchange controls, and subsidies. In this case, the delocalization of all or
a portion of the production process (e.g. production of components/parts
and/or dierent locations) leads to low costs benets (vertical FDI) (Ba-
niak et al, 2005; Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007; Pantelidis and
Nikolopoulos, 2008; and Kinda, 2010). Following on these, Dunning (1993)WHY DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT GO WHERE IT GOES? 439
identied four categories of motives for FDI: resource seeking (to access
raw materials, labor force, and physical infrastructure resources), market
seeking (horizontal strategy to access the host-country domestic market),
eciency seeking (vertical strategy to take advantage of lower labor costs,
especially in developing countries), and strategic-asset seeking (to access
research and development, innovation, and advanced technology) (Cleeve,
2008).
The literature on the forces driving FDI has also identied both poli-
cy and non-policy factors as drivers of FDI (Fedderke and Romm, 2006).
Policy factors include openness, product-market regulation, labor market
arrangements, corporate tax rates, direct FDI restrictions, trade barrier-
s, and infrastructure. Non-policy factors include market size of the host
country (often measured by the GDP), distance/transport costs, factor
proportions (or factor endowments) and political and economic stability
(Mateev, 2009).
The pull factors or domestic factors include economic, socio-political and
structural conditions, including uncertainty, while the push factors relate to
cyclical and structural conditions, irreversibility and herding (see Fernndez-
Arias, 1996; Fernndez-Arias and Montiel, 1996; Gottschalk, 2001).
Fernndez-Arias (1996), Fern andez-Arias and Montiel (1996), Gottschalk
(2001) and calvo et al. (1996) present a two-factor classication of the
factors that inuence FDI ows: as \push" (those that are external to
the recipients of FDI | relating to cyclical and structural conditions, ir-
reversibility and herding) or \pull" factors (those internal to them such as
economic, socio-political and structural conditions, including uncertainty).
A similar classication has emerged from the works of Tsai (1991), Ning
and Reed (1995) and Lall et al. (2003) who see these factors as (i) those
on the \supply-side" (e.g., skilled labor, research and development, and in-
frastructure), (ii) those on the \demand-side" (host country economic and
social variables or pull factors, including interest rates, tax and tari levels,
market size and potential, wage rates, income distribution, human capital,
cost dierentials, exchange rates, scal policies, trade policies, physical
and cultural distance, among others) (Karakaplan et al., 2005); and (iii)
\institutional factors" (e.g., culture, intellectual property rights, transac-
tion costs, political risk, corruption, and bureaucracy). Also, Qiu (2003)
examined the implications of comparative advantage for foreign direct in-
vestment incentives. Using a trade-cum-FDI model with two countries (the
FDI host country and the FDI source country) and two sectors (auto and
textile, in each country), the author found that the host country's compara-
tive advantage sector is more attractive to inward FDI than its comparative
disadvantage sector. In particular, he found that the source country's auto
rms have weaker FDI incentives than its textile rms and hence the host
country's comparative advantage sector is more attractive to inward FDI.440 JOHN C. ANYANWU
Razin, Sadka and Yuen (2000) have also demonstrated that there is a se-
vere \home bias" problem with regard to equity ows. Thus, the degree
of international capital mobility is signicantly limited by this home bias
phenomenon though today large amounts of capital move across interna-
tional borders to take advantage of rates of return and risk diversication
benets.
Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis (2007) have grouped the factors de-
termining the inward ow of FDI into three categories: basic economic
factors, trade and the exchange market policies, and other aspects of the
investment climate. The basic economic factors include the dierence in the
rate of return on capital across countries, portfolio diversication strategy
of investors and market size of the host country. Trade and foreign exchange
policy considerations relate to trade liberalization and exchange rate move-
ments and their volatility (Froot and Stein, 1991). Business climate factors
relate to infrastructure (Wheeler and Mody, 1992), labor costs and avail-
ability of skilled labor/education, incentive factors, political risk, economic
factors (per capita GDP, GDP growth rate, economic integration, impor-
tance of transport, commerce and communication), social factors (degree of
urbanization), political stability (the number of constitutional changes in
government leadership), the role of institutions (in terms of commitments
to and enforcement of rules) (Root and Ahmed, 1979; Schneider and Frey,
1985), the stability of basic macroeconomic policies (scal, monetary, and
social) (Baniak et al, 2005), and the catalyzing eect of foreign aid (Harms
and Lutz, 2006; Kimura and Todo, 2010).
In particular, the literature has identied ve possible multiple channels
through which foreign aid aects FDI, positively and negatively. These
channels include:
(a) A positive \vanguard eect" through which foreign aid from a par-
ticular donor country promotes FDI from the same donor country but not
from other countries (Kimura and Todo, 2010). This vanguard eect may
occur due to three reasons, including when information on the local busi-
ness environment of the recipient country is exclusively transmitted to rm-
s of the donor country followed the provision of aid (Mody et al., 2003);
government's provision of foreign aid may reduce the recipient country's
investment risks perceived subjectively by rms of the donor country; and
foreign aid may bring the donor country-specic business practices, rules,
and institutions into recipient countries. These reasons may lead foreign
aid promoting FDI from the same donor country but does not necessarily
promote FDI from other countries (Kimura and Todo, 2010);
(b) A positive \nancing eect" by which aid improves the ability of the
recipient country to nance outows (through improvement of the balance
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(c) A negative \Dutch-disease eect" by distorting resource allocations
between tradable and non-tradable sectors. That is foreign aid is likely
to increase the supply of tradables and lower their price relative to non-
tradables. Indeed, given that FDI in developing countries is mostly invested
in tradable sectors, foreign aid may discourage FDI through this channel
that distorts the allocation of domestic resources (Arellano et al, 2009). In
particular, this may occur through the adverse eect of natural resource
revenues on the manufacturing sector, via a real exchange rate appreciation;
(d) A negative \rent-seeking eect" by which foreign aid encourages un-
productive rent-seeking activities in the recipient country, leading to a drop
in productivity (Harms and Lutz, 2006); and
(e) A positive \infrastructure eect" by which aid improves the recipient
country's economic and social infrastructure (such as physical/economic
infrastructure, including transport, telecommunications, and power/energy
(electricity) as well as social infrastructure, including education, health or a
reliable and well-functioning bureaucracy) (Harms and Lutz, 2006; Kimura
and Todo, 2010) and hence raises the marginal product of capital in the
country.
4. REVIEW OF RECENT EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
We organize recent empirical literature on the factors that make FDI go
where they do around key factors as shown below, though in many cases
results revolve around multiple factors.
Foreign Aid
There are a few studies which examine the relation between foreign aid
and FDI by using cross-country panel data, most notably Kimura and To-
do (2010), Harms and Lutz (2006), Yasin (2005), and Karakaplan et al
(2005). Kimura and Todo (2010) investigate whether and how foreign aid
facilitates FDI ows into less developed countries and nd that foreign aid
in general does not have any signicant eect on FDI but when they allow
for dierences in the size of aid eects across donor countries, they nd
robust evidence that foreign aid from Japan in particular has a vanguard
eect (that is, Japanese aid promotes FDI from Japan but does not attract
FDI from other countries. Their nding is consistent with Blaise (2005)
who uses province-level data for China and nds that Japanese aid in China
has a positive and signicant impact on the locational choice of Japanese
private investors in China. On the other hand, Harms and Lutz (2006) nd
that the eect of aid on FDI is generally insignicant but signicantly pos-
itive for countries in which private agents face heavy regulatory burdens.
Yasin (2005) empirically investigates the relationship between ocial de-442 JOHN C. ANYANWU
velopment assistances and foreign direct investment ows using panel data
from 11 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1990C2003. The re-
sults show that bilateral ocial development assistance has a signicant
and positive inuence on foreign direct investment ows while multilateral
development assistance does not have a statistically signicant eect on
foreign direct investment ows. Karakaplan et al (2005) also nd an in-
signicant eect of aid on FDI, but that good governance and developed
nancial markets lead to a positive eect of aid.
Infrastructure Development
Studies by Musila and Sigue (2006) and Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006)
on FDI show FDI in Africa is dependent on the development of infrastruc-
ture. Also, other studies on developing countries (Mengistu and Adams,
2007; Cotton and Ramachandran, 2001); emerging economies (Zhang, 2001);
Western Balkan Countries (Kersan-Skabic and Orlic, 2007) and Southeast
European Countries (Botric and  Skuic, 2006) show the signicant role of
infrastructure development in attracting the inow of FDI. However, the
results of a study on US FDI ow to Africa by Nnadozie and Osili (2004)
nd less robust evidence on the role of infrastructure on foreign direct
investment. Results from Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2004) indicate that
telecommunications infrastructures economic growth, openness and signif-
icantly increase FDI inows to Africa while credit to the private sector,
export processing zones, and capital gains tax have signicantly negative
eect.
Gholami et al (2006) uses a sample of 23 developed and developing coun-
tries observed for the period 1976C99 based on ICT data availability to
show that in developed countries, existing ICT infrastructure attracts F-
DI; a higher level of ICT investment leads to a higher level of FDI inows
but in developing countries the direction of causality goes instead from F-
DI to ICT. Findings by Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis (2007) indicate
that infrastructure availability, openness, and sound economic and political
conditions are important for South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in
attracting FDI. In a study of South East European Countries (SEECs),
Dauti (2008) identies ICT infrastructure market as the major factor pos-
itively inuencing FDI inows while seeking factors (GDP growth, GDP
per capita, GDP level) have perverse signs, showing signicantly negative
eects on FDI inows.
Institutional and Political Factors and Investment Climate
Using bilateral FDI stocks around the world, Daude and Stein (2007)
explore the importance of a wide range of institutional variables as de-
terminants of the location of FDI and nd that better institutions have
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the unpredictability of laws, regulations and policies, excessive regulato-
ry burden, government instability and lack of commitment play a major
role in deterring FDI. Also, Campos and Kinoshita (2003), using a panel
data set for 25 transition economies between 1990 and 1998, nd that the
main determinants of inward FDI are institutions, agglomeration, and trade
openness. In CIS countries, natural resources and infrastructure matter,
while agglomeration matters only for Eastern European and Baltic coun-
tries. Ali et al (2006) examine the role of institutions in determining FDI
inows using a panel of 69 countries during 1981 and 2005 and nd that
institutions are a robust predictor of overall FDI and that the most sig-
nicant institutional aspects are linked to propriety rights, the rule of law
and expropriation risk, and especially in the services and manufacturing
sectors.
Corruption and low transparency are found to hinder FDI inows (Voy-
er and Beamish, 2004; Zhao and Du, 2003; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002;
Kersan-Skabic and Orlic, 2007) just as ensuring property right in South
Africa (Fedderke and Romm, 2006) and developing countries (Kapuria-
Foreman, 2007) aect FDI inows. Using 17 countries over the period
1994C2004 in examining the impact of governance on FDI inows, Kham-
fula's (2007) results show that corruption is more harmful in an import
substitution world than in an export promotion one. The ndings agree
with those of Al-Sadig (2009) who uses panel data from 117 host countries
over the period 1984-2004 to show that overall, higher corruption level-
s decrease FDI inows. Thus, secure property rights, political stability,
and lack of corruption allow markets to properly function, and therefore
attracting MNCs (Disdier and Mayer, 2004; Kinda, 2010). However, Al-
Sadig's (2009) results show that after controlling for other characteristics
of the host country (such as the quality of institutions), the negative eects
of corruption disappear and sometimes becomes positive but statistically
insignicant. In what appears to run against conventional evidence, Kim
(2010) nds that countries with high level of corruption of government and
low level of democracy have higher FDI inows while being lower for those
with greater political rights.
Poor governance and inhospitable regulatory environments (Dupasquier
and Osakwe, 2006); foreign ownership ceiling in sectors open for FDI, pol-
icy on repatriation of capital and remittance of prot (Tarzi, 2005), and
government regulations and restrictions on equity holdings by foreigners
(Cotton and Ramachandran, 2001) all are found to have negative impact on
FDI inow. Also, political stability is inversely related to FDI inows (Du-
pasquier and Osakwe, 2006; and Kyereboah-Coleman and Agyire-Tettey,
2008; Li (2008). Cleeve (2008) uses a data on 16 SSA countries and nds
that that in addition to traditional variables and government policies to
attract foreign investment to Africa, tax holidays are important. Asiedu444 JOHN C. ANYANWU
(2004) examines the eect of three types of capital control policies on F-
DI inows: (i) the existence of multiple exchange rates; (ii) restrictions
on capital account, and (iii) restrictions on the repatriation of export pro-
ceeds. The author nds that the impact of capital controls on FDI inows
varies by region and has changed over time: in the 1970s and 1980s, none
of the policies had a signicant impact on FDI inows but in the 1990s, all
three were signicant. However, the author nds that capital controls have
no eect on FDI to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the Middle East, but
adversely aects FDI to Latin America and East Asia. Baniak et al (2005)
analyze the legal environment for FDI in some transition economies and
their results show that (i) high volatility of scal and business regulations
makes the inow of FDI smaller, (ii) macroeconomic and legal instability
leads to adverse selection of the investors, and (iii) higher variability of
basic macroeconomic fundamentals reduces the inow of FDI.
The study by Clarke and Logan (2008) shows that FDI ows are greatest
to countries that have less political risk and better physical infrastructure.
Contrary to majority of studies, they show that FDI ows are greater to
countries with weaker currencies and smaller populations. In addition they
nd that FDI ows are concentrated in industries where asset exploitation
is most likely, such as one time privatization of assets in telecommunication-
s, and where there is the greatest potential to earn foreign exchange such
as the tourism, mining and quarrying, and petroleum sectors. Pantelidis
and Nikolopoulos (2008) investigate the FDI attractiveness for Greece as a
host country compared with the rest of the EU countries and nd that the
crucial factors for the low FDI attractiveness in Greece are inecient public
governance, high taxation, inecient infrastructure, and general macroeco-
nomic conditions. In a study of a sample developed and developing coun-
tries over 1995C97, Globerman (2002) nds that governance infrastructure
is an important determinant of both FDI inows though investments in
governance infrastructure are subject to diminishing returns, so that the
benets, in terms of inows, are most pronounced for smaller and devel-
oping economies. Kinda (2010), using rm-level data across 77 developing
countries, shows that constraints related to investment climate hamper F-
DI. In particular, physical infrastructure problems, nancing constraints,
and institutional problems discourage FDI. Botri c and  Skui c (2005) us-
es data on FDI inows to South East European Countries to determine
the main host country determinants of FDI and concludes that FDI in-
ows are largely dependent on privatization, trade regime, the density of
infrastructure, and agglomeration.
Using a panel of 97 countries, Dutta and Roy (2008) investigates the
role of political risk in the association of FDI and nancial development
and show that the impact of nancial development on FDI becomes nega-
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factors aect the relationship by altering the threshold level of nancial de-
velopment. Quazi (2007) estimates the determinants of FDI to nine Latin
American countries, with emphasis on the investment climate, and nd-
s that FDI inow is signicantly boosted by foreign investors' increased
familiarity with the host economy, better infrastructure, higher return on
investment, and greater trade openness, but the inow is signicantly de-
pressed by lack of economic freedom. Also, FDI inow is negatively cor-
related with policy changes that result in higher trade barriers, more re-
pressive taxation, more restrictive foreign investment code, more repressive
nancial system, and further price and wage controls. The study identies
two factors, namely, excessive bureaucracy and inecient nancial market-
s, which act as locational disadvantages for Mexico in comparison to its
regional `rival' countries.
Attraction of Natural Resources
The works of Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006); Aseidu, 2002; and De-
ichmann et al., 2003), for example report that the availability of natural
resources has a positive and signicant eect on FDI inows. Also, Mo-
hamed and Sidiropoulos (2010), using a panel of 36 countries (12 MENA
countries and other 24 developing countries), conclude that the key deter-
minants of FDI inows in MENA countries are the natural resources, the
size of the host economy, the government size, and institutional variables.
Asiedu (2006), using a panel data for 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) over the period 1984C2000, nd that countries that are endowed
with natural resources or have large markets attract more FDI. In addi-
tion, good infrastructure, an educated labor force, macroeconomic stability,
openness to FDI, an ecient legal system, less corruption and political sta-
bility promote inward FDI. Hailu (2010) conducts an empirical analysis of
the demand side determinants of the inow of FDI to African nations and
concludes that natural resources, labor quality, trade openness, market ac-
cession and infrastructure condition positively and signicantly aect FDI
inows but the availability of stock market has positive but insignicant
eect.
Human Resources Development, Productivity and Cost
The study by Reiter et al (2010) shows that FDI inows are more strongly
positively related to improvement in human development when FDI policy
restricts foreign investors from entering some economic sectors and when
it discriminates against foreign investors relative to domestic investors. In
addition, it nds that the relationship between FDI and improvement in
human development is also more strongly positive when corruption is low.
Markusen (2001) nd that knowledge capital is important for FDI inows
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important determinants of inward FDI. Nonnemberg and Cardoso de Men-
don ca (2004), in a panel data analysis for 38 developing countries (including
transition economies) for the 1975-2000 period, conclude that FDI is cor-
related to level of schooling, the economy's degree of openness, risk and
variables related to macroeconomic performance like ination, risk and av-
erage rate of economic growth. Alsan et al (2006) in a panel data analysis of
74 industrialized and developing countries over 1980C2000, nd that gross
inows of FDI are strongly and positively inuenced by population health
(life expectancy) as a proxy of human capital development in low- and
middle-income countries. Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) and Miyamoto (2008)
have shown the positive eect of human capital generally on FDI inows
while Tarzi (2005) and Baeka and Okawa (2001) cite workers' productivity
and Khair-UZ-Zaman et al. (2006) and Jeon and Rhee (2008) cite labor
cost.
Basic Macroeconomic and Other Factors
Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2006), using data for three countries | Chile,
Malaysia and Thailand {C nd that GDP causes FDI in Chile and not vice
versa while in the case of both Malaysia and Thailand, there is strong
evidence of a bi-directional causality between GDP and FDI. Klein and
Rosnegren (1994), Jeon and Rhee (2008) nd strong evidence that relative
wealth signicantly aects inward foreign direct investment while Brah-
masrene and Jiranyakul (2001) nd that real income is a signicant factor
determining the inow of FDI. However, Nnadozie and Osili (2004) nd
less robust evidence on the role of GDP per capita on FDI inow but
GDP growth is found to have signicant impact. Market size is found to
play an important role in FDI inows (Barrell and Pain, 1996; Nigh, 1986;
Anyanwu, 1998; Fedderke and Romm, 2006; Tarzi, 2005; Khair-UZ-Zaman
et al, 2006; Zhang, 2001) though the results of Kyereboah-Coleman and
Agyire-Tettey (2008) indicate that most foreign investors do not consider
this factor in making a decision to invest or otherwise in Ghana. Ination
as a proxy for economic instability has been found to negatively aect FDI
inows (Nnadozie and Osili, 2004; Khair-UZ-Zaman et al, 2006) though the
ndings of Brahmasrene and Jiranyakul (2001) indicate otherwise. Trade
openness has also been found to be positively associated with FDI inows
(Yih Yun et al., 2000; Asiedu, 2002; Feils and Rahman, 2008).
A study by Kamaly (2007) sheds some light on the direction and de-
terminants of the aggregate Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activity di-
rected to developing countries in the 1990s, concluding that openness has
a signicant eect on M&A, but quantitatively its eect is minimal while
depreciation in the domestic exchange rate strongly and positively aects
M&A. In addition, higher level of stock market activity and depth in de-
veloping countries decrease the amount of M&A directed to them. OladipoWHY DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT GO WHERE IT GOES? 447
(2008) examines the determinants of Nigeria's FDI inow for the period
1970-2005 and nds that the nation's potential market size, the degree of
export orientation, human capital, providing enabling environment through
the provision of infrastructural facilities, and macroeconomic stability are
important determinants of FDI ows.
Varied results have been found on the inuence of exchange rate on FDI
inows: A case study on Ghana by Kyereboah-Coleman and Agyire-Tettey
(2008) on the volatility of real exchange rate shows that the volatility of
the real exchange rate has a negative inuence on FDI inow while em-
pirical investigation of rm level data on the US FDI to Korea (Jeon and
Rhee, 2008) shows that FDI inows have signicant association with re-
al exchange rate and expected exchange rate changes just as the results
of Ramiraz (2006) and Cushman (1985) arm the same. However, Brah-
masrene and Jiranyakul (2001) and Dewenter (1995) nd no statistically
signicant relationship between the level of the exchange rate and FDI in-
ows (see Ajayi, 2006 and Naud and Krugell, 2007 for survey of evidence).
Nasser and Gomez (2009), in a study of 15 Latin American countries
from 1978 to 2003, nd that FDI inows are (i) positively correlated with
stock market trading volume 9an important variable that reects the devel-
opment of the stock market) and (ii) signicantly and positively correlated
with the level of private credit oered by the banking sector. Others who
nd that nancial development encourages FDI inows are Kinda (2010),
Deichmann et al. (2003), and Jenkins and Thomas (2002).
In a study of China and India, Zheng's (2009) ndings show that market
growth, imports, labor costs, and country political risk/policy liberaliza-
tion are the determinants of inward FDI for both countries. However,
exports, market size, and borrowing costs are important to China's FDI,
while geographical and cultural distance factors are important to India's F-
DI. Mateev's (2009) study of Central and Southeastern European countries
nds that population, distance, GDP, risk, labor costs, and corruption can
explain, to a large extent, the size of FDI ows into transition economies.
Lederman et al (2010) use international data and a micro-data set of rms
in thirteen Southern African Developing Countries (SADCs) to investigate
the benets and determinants of FDI in the region and nd that income lev-
el, human capital, demographic structure, institutions, and economic track
record aect FDI inows per capita. They nd some dierences between
SADC and the rest of the world in FDI behavior, namely, that in SADC,
the income level is less important and openness more so. However, relative
to other regions of the world, SADC's low FDI inows are explained by e-
conomic fundamentals (e.g., previous growth rates, average income, phone
density, and the adult share of population). In the same manner, Leit~ ao
(2010) examines the FDI attractiveness for Greece as a host country in448 JOHN C. ANYANWU
the period 1998-2007 and nds that trade openness, market size and labor
costs are signicant factors to explain inward FDI to Greece.
5. THE MODEL AND DATA: DRIVING FACTORS OF FDI
INFLOWS TO AFRICA
5.1. The Model
Based on the theoretical framework presented above and the structure of
African economies as well as the characteristics of FDI inows to Africa, we
use the following model in estimating the factors that make FDI go where
they do in African countries:
FDIijt = 0 + 1(UrbanPop)ijt + 2(GDPPC)ijt + 3(Openness)ijt
+4(Financialdev)ijt + 5L(Inflation)ijt + 6(ExchangeRate)ijt
+7(Infrastructure)ijt + 8(HumanCaptital)ijt + 9(Aid)ijt
+10(GDPGrowth)ijt + 11(FDI 1)ijt + 12(Corruption)ijt
+13(Re gulatoryQuality)ijt + 14(RuleofLaw)ijt
+15(exporters)ijt + 	(Re gions)ijt + "ijt (1)
where i and j denote countries, t denotes time, and the variables are
dened as:
 FDIij denotes the net FDI inows as % of GDP,
 UrbanPop is urban population as a percentage of total population,
 GDPPC is gross domestic product per capita (US$),
 Openness is openness index - total trade (% of GDP),
 Financialdev is nancial development (domestic credit to the private
sector as % of GDP),
 Ination is the annual ination rate,
 ExchangeRate is the ocial exchange rate to the US$ (annual average),
 Infrastructure is xed and mobile subscribers (per 1000 people),
 HumanCapital is gross secondary school enrolment,
 Aid represents net foreign oda (% of GDP,
 GDPGrowth is real GDP growth rate (%),
 FDI 1 represents rst lag of FDI,
 Corruption represents control of corruption (percentile rank 0-100,
 RegulatorQuality represents regulatory quality (percentile rank 0-100),
 RuleofLaw represents rule of law (percentile rank 0-100),
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 Regions represent is a binary variable representing the various regions
of Africa (Central Africa, East Africa, North Africa, Southern Africa, and
West Africa),
  is a vector of coecients, and
 "ij represents the myriad other inuences on FDI, assumed to be well
behaved.
All the variables are expressed in natural logarithm except dummies. As
noted in the section on the theoretical framework, \market seeking" is a
relevant motivation of MNCs' investments in developing countries such as
Africa. Therefore, market size is proxied by urban population (as percent-
age of total population) of the host country (Fan et al, 2009) and GDP
per capita (the level of economic activity/development) (Javorcik et al.,
2011; Al-Sadig, 2009), which are expected to have a positive sign. Foreign
investors are well aware that most urban dwellers constitute the largest
consumers of their products and would cherish and crave for such market.
Market-seeking investments can also be motivated by the need to overcome
external trade barriers hence FDI is expected to be positively aected by
trade openness (Anyanwu, 1998; Morisset, 2000; Anyanwu and Erhijakpor,
2004).
As Nasser and Gomez (2009) note, nancial development is important in
FDI decisions because it aects the cost structure of investment projects.
Kinda (2010) observes that nancial development is an engine of economic
growth, providing better business opportunities for customers and rms.
This is proxied by the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to
GDP. This is an indicator of domestic nancial development, potentially
an important factor in driving international nance. High domestic credit
to the private sector also implies abundance of domestic capital and as
such, foreign capital in the form of FDI would not be needed. Indeed, a
high level of \credit to the private sector" is an indication of the abundance
of domestic capital. As such, foreign capital in the form of FDI would not
be needed as much hence a negative relationship between private credit and
FDI inows. Another possible explanation is that such negative relation is
another manifestation of the negative relationship that exists between FDI
and other types of ows, mainly bank loans (see, for example, Fernndez-
Arias and Hausmann, 2000).
Ination is used as an indicator of macroeconomic instability (Buckley et
al., 2007) A stable macroeconomic environment promotes FDI by showing
less investment risk. High exchange rate value relative to the US dollar,
which implies a depreciated currency, will, ceteris paribus, attract higher
FDI while the reverse ultimately dissuades foreign investment. This is be-
cause exchange rate allows us to determine the eect of relative wealth and
relative labor costs on FDI inows. Thus, a depreciation of a country's450 JOHN C. ANYANWU
exchange rate will increase the relative wealth of foreign rms and lead to
an increase in foreign purchases of domestic assets. In addition, a depreci-
ation of a country's foreign exchange will lead to capital inows as foreign
countries try to take advantage of relatively cheaper domestic labor.
The number of telephone mainlines and mobile phone subscribers (per
1000 people) is used to proxy the availability of infrastructures and commu-
nications facilities in African countries, both regarded by foreign companies
as important pre-requisites for their investments (Khadaroo and Seetanah,
2007; Calderon and Serven, 2008). As Addison and Heshmati (2003) have
shown, ICT infrastructure and skills are now critical in integrating local
producers into international technological and communications networks,
and in attracting vertical FDI in services as well as manufacturing. Also,
Campos and Kinoshita (2003) have argued that good infrastructure is a
necessary condition for foreign investors to operate successfully, regardless
of the type of FDI. The use of the availability of main telephone lines is
because they are necessary to facilitate communication between the home
and host countries.
Since the presence of skilled human capital is usually felt as a relevant
pull factor for foreign MNCs, the level of human capital is measured by
gross secondary school enrolment. Secondary school attainment of the host
country represents accumulated stock of human capital, which is a measure
of labor quality and indicative of the level of education and skills of the
workers within a country. This variable is expected to be positively related
to FDI inows.
The aid variable used in our analysis is net ocial development assistance
(ODA) as percentage of GDP as a catalyst to FDI since it is assumed to
raise the productivity of private capital by nancing public investments.
Real GDP growth rate is also used to represent a country's economic
track record and as an indicator of protable investment opportunities. It
is also included to allow for a systematic relation between cross-border -
nancial activity and the level of development. Indeed, economic growth has
an eect on the domestic market, where countries with expanding domestic
markets should attract higher levels of FDI.
To test for agglomeration eects, we relate current FDI inows to past
FDI inows and other explanatory variables. Agglomeration economies
may exist given that foreign investors may be attracted to countries with
more existing foreign investment. Indeed, being less knowledgeable of a
country's environment, foreign investors may view the investment decisions
by others as a good signal of favorable conditions and invest there too, so
as to reduce uncertainty. This is proxied by the rst lag of the dependent
variable.
Another variable is used to evaluate African countries' access to FDI
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political space) | which represent important factor in attracting FDI. This
is proxied by the control of corruption, regulatory quality and rule of law
(see also, Lederman et al., 2010; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002).
Many African countries receive much FDI in natural resource-based sec-
tors, as they are rich in minerals, oil and natural gas. Indeed, both the-
oretical and empirical literature has shown that the need to get a secure
access to natural resources is one of the main motivations driving MNC-
s to Africa, indicating one of the key characteristics of African countries
in terms of natural resource endowment. Natural resource endowment is
proxied by dummies as to whether a country is a net oil exporter or not. Fi-
nally, to capture any other unmeasured inuences on the sub-regional and
continental investment environment, as well as to allow for sub-regional
eects, we include sub-regional dummies.
5.2. Data and Estimation Methodology
The data set used for the empirical analysis consists of annual data from
1996 to 2008 for 53 African countries. Table 3 below reports the summary
statistics of the data, while Appendix Table A reports the description and
sources of the variables. In particular, Table 3 shows that FDI inows to
Africa as a percentage of GDP is very low, averaging just 5 percent during
the period, 1996 and 2008. As noted earlier, natural logarithms are used to
transform the variables thus reducing the risk related to heteroskedasticity,
which is nonetheless common in cross-country analyses. Figures 6 and 7
present the scatter plots of mean net FDI inows in billions of US dollars
and as a percentage of GDP, respectively, during the period of our analysis,
1996-2008. Figure 6 conrms the point made with respect to Figure 5 that
the top ten country recipients of FDI in Africa are Egypt, South Africa,
Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Congo Republic, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and
Chad. However, as a percentage of GDP, Figure 7 shows Liberia and
Equatorial Guinea at the top.
Since our sample is a cross-sectional data, we perform four dierent em-
pirical techniques to strengthen our empirical results. First, we perform
robust pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). Second, we perform feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) for the cross-sectional time-series linear
model. This method allows estimation in the presence of AR(1) auto-
correlation within cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across
panels. Third, for robustness check, we take cognizance of the view that
FDI decision may be made based on historical data and hence all the in-
dependent variables that are supposed to have eect on FDI inow would
materialize their eect the next period onward. Therefore, all the indepen-
dent variables are lagged by one period for all variables and re-estimated
by OLS/FGLS methods. Fourth, as stated below, for further robustness
and to take care of any possible endogeneity in the aid variable, we use the452 JOHN C. ANYANWU
two-step (IV) ecient generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation
method on the lagged specication.
Only Africa (sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa) countries are exam-
ined in this study since the factors that determine the inow of FDI to
Africa are dierent from those that determine FDI elsewhere in addition
to the fact that the structure and characteristics of African countries are
dierent from other developing countries. In addition, there is no doubt
that this choice will ensure that the results are relevant to the African
continent, its sub-regions and individual countries.
TABLE 3.
Descriptive Statistics of Main Regression Variables (Excluding Dummies), 1996-2008
Standard
Variable Observations Mean Median Deviation Range
FDI 662 0.05 0.02 0.11 1.45
Urban Population Share 689 39.1 37.7 17.44 79.88
GDP per capita 668 1438.71 482.84 2454.31 28024.89
Openness 634 77.15 69.52 39.68 265.58
Financial development 651 39.74 18.00 66.53 1173.23
Ination 585 66.34 5.75 1024.72 24411
Exchange Rate 651 633.36 206.74 1497.76 14695.19
Infrastructure 637 129.26 41.03 209.54 1256.83
Human Capital 439 38.08 30.98 25.22 108.85
Aid 663 11.06 8.39 13.06 143.69
GDP Growth 663 5.88 4.74 6.92 106.27
Control of Corruption 516 31.87 29.3 21.76 84.5
Regulatory Quality 530 29.18 27.6 18.71 79.2
Rule of Law 527 29.88 29.00 20.83 81.00
Note: These are raw data before transformations and winsorization.
Source: Author's Calculations.
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6.1. OLS/FGLS Results for Level Data
Table 4 shows the results when Equation (1) is estimated using robust
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The log transformation of all the variables
allows us to interpret the coecients as elasticities.
The key market size | urban population share | has signicant positive
relationship with FDI inows to Africa. Thus, African countries with large
markets (in terms of the urban population size) attract more FDI. Though
GDP per capita does not have a positively signicant association with FDI
inows (consistent with the ndings of Alsan et al. 2006), the other proxyWHY DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT GO WHERE IT GOES? 453
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for market size, urban population share, is signicant at the 5 percent
level. The lack of positive signicance of GDP per capita could be due to a
balancing of the market size eect with the cost of production eect, which
should work in the opposite directions.
The coecient on openness (the highest outside those for the dummy
variables) is positive and highly signicant and consistent with foreign
investment to developing countries such as those in Africa being mainly454 JOHN C. ANYANWU
export-oriented. It is also consistent with the FDI theory that openness
is indicative of the host country's ease of access to the world market for
material inputs, so the MNCs can obtain the raw materials at low price. It
also suggests that economies in which trade is important also have relative-
ly higher FDI (for instance they pursue policies that are more attractive to
foreign investors). Thus, implementation of more liberal economic policies
would certainly attract more foreign investments.
The negative signicance of nancial depth shows that greater nancial
development in African countries leads to less FDI inows, similar to the
results of Walsh and Yu (2010) and Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2004) for
more advanced economies and in accordance with a priori expectations.
The result conrms the hypothesis that high level of credit to the private
sector is an indication of the abundance of domestic capital and as such,
foreign capital in the form of FDI would not be needed.
The amount of foreign aid (ODA) to African countries is positively sig-
nicant and conrms that aid has a spillover eect on the FDI decision
of foreign investors in Africa. The agglomeration eect appears to have
a great impact on where FDI goes in Africa for the variable is strongly
signicant.
Natural resource endowment (especially oil) attracts FDI inows in Africa.
The sub-regional dummies for East, Northern, Southern and Western Africa
are highly statistically signicantly related to FDI inows, showing that
reforms being carried out by countries in these regions are paying o in
wooing foreign investors. The other variables are insignicant in attracting
FDI to Africa.
6.2. Robustness Checks using Lagged Data
6.2.1. OLS/FGLS Results
As stated earlier, there is the proposition that any FDI decision is made
based on historical data and hence all the independent variables that are
supposed to have eect on FDI inow would materialize their eect the
next period onward. Therefore, for robustness check we present results
in which all the independent variables are lagged by one period (see also
Lederman et al, 2010).
Table 5 shows the results when Equation (1) is estimated using one-
period lagged variables and with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and FGLS.
The results conrm the continued signicance of urban population share,
trade openness, nancial development, agglomeration, natural resource en-
dowment/exploitation in inuencing where FDI goes to in Africa. They
also conrm the continued signicance of sub-regional dummies for East
and Southern Africa.WHY DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT GO WHERE IT GOES? 455
TABLE 4.
Robust Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and FGLS Estimates of the Factors
That Make FDI Go Where They Do in Africa
Variable (1) (Robust OLS) (2) (FGLS)
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R-Squared 0.5908 Wald chi2=363.87
F-Statistic 19.29 Prob > 0 = 0:0000
Prob > 0 0.0000
N 252 N = 252
Note:  = 1% signicant level;  = 5% signicant level;  = 10%
signicant level.
Source: Author's Estimations.456 JOHN C. ANYANWU
An interesting new result is the nding that government quality, repre-
sented by the rule of law variable, is statistically signicantly associated
with higher FDI inows to Africa. Therefore, FDI inows to the continent
correlate positively with the prevalence of the rule of law, meaning that
the quality of government matters for making FDI inows go where they
do in Africa. However, FDI inows are not reliably related to the control
of corruption and regulatory quality in the continent.
6.2.2. IV-GMM Results
However, one possible problem with Equation (1) is that it assumes that
all of the right-hand side variables in the model|including foreign aid|
are exogenous to FDI inows, even when the lagged independent variables
are used. It is possible that foreign aid may be endogenous to FDI inows.
Reverse causality may be taking place: foreign aid may be increasing FDI,
but FDI may also be aecting the level of foreign aid being received.
Without accounting for this reverse causality, all of the estimated coe-
cients in Table 5 may be biased. One way of accounting for possible endoge-
nous regressors is to pursue an instrumental variables approach. Therefore,
to deal with this problem, we follow Catrinescu et al (2006), Aggarwal et al
(2006) and Anyanwu (2010) in estimating the equations instrumentalizing
the foreign aid variable with its relevant lagged levels, using a the two-step
(IV) ecient generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation method.
Table 6 shows the rst-stage results from the IV-GMM estimations using
the lagged explanatory variables. Again, the variables are in logarithms.
First, we present the F-statistic for weak instruments. This is a test of the
signicance of our instruments in predicting foreign aid. The F-statistics
is above the critical value, at 1 percent signicance, indicating that our es-
timates do not suer from a weak instruments problem. Second, we report
the Hansen J test of overidenditfying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis
in this case is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term
and that excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated
equation. Again, these tests conrm the validity of our instruments.
Table 7 presents the second-stage IV-GMM results. As for the impact of
foreign aid, we continue to nd that it has a positive and signicant impact
on FDI inows to Africa. These results conrm that the positive impact
of foreign aid on FDI inows to Africa is not due to endogeneity biases. In
addition, Table 7 demonstrates that our ndings with respect to the main
signicant variables are not aected by the IV-GMM method. For example,
apart from foreign aid, urban population share, trade openness, 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TABLE 5.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and FGLS Estimates of the Factors That Make
FDI Go Where They Do in Africa Using Lagged Independent Variables
Variable (1) (OLS) (2) (FGLS)
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R-Squared 0.4736 Wald chi2=288.48
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development, agglomeration, the rule of law (institutional quality), natural
resources (oil producing countries), and sub-regional dummies for East and
Southern Africa continue to signicantly aect FDI inows to Africa as in
the OLS results using lagged independent variables.
6.3. Conclusions And Policy Implications
What determines why FDI inows go to where they do in African coun-
tries? To shed light on the potential drivers of FDI to Africa, we perform
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations and feasible generalized
least squares (FGLS) for the cross-sectional time-series linear model, us-
ing level data. For robustness check, we take cognizance of the view that
FDI decision may be made based on historical data and hence use one-
period lag of independent variables for re-estimation by OLS/FGLS. For
further robustness check and to take care of any possible endogeneity in
the aid variable, we also use the two-step (IV) ecient generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimation method on the lagged data set.
The empirical model attempts to predict the level of FDI inows (as
percent of GDP) as a function of market size (urban population share and
GDP per capita), trade openness, nancial development, macroeconom-
ic stability, exchange rates, infrastructure, human capital, economic track
records (GDP growth rate), agglomeration, institutional quality (control
of corruption, regulatory quality and the rule of law) and natural resource
endowment/exploitation. In addition, we look for sub-regional-specic ef-
fects. We nd that the East and Southern African sub-regional coecients
are consistently signicant, which implies that the sub-regions perform
above expectation, given their market size (urban population share and
GDP per capita), trade openness, nancial development, macroeconom-
ic stability, exchange rates, infrastructure, human capital, economic track
records (GDP growth rate), agglomeration, institutional quality and natu-
ral resource endowment/exploitation. However, we nd that the other sub-
regional coecients are insignicant, which implies that those sub-regions
perform as expected, given the same set of variables.
The major estimation results can be summarized as follows: (i) there is
a positive relationship between market size (urban population share) and
FDI inows to Africa; (ii) openness to trade has a positive impact on FDI
ows; (iii) Higher nancial development has negative eect on FDI inows
to Africa; (iv) the prevalence of the rule of law increases FDI inows to
Africa; (v) higher FDI goes where foreign aid also goes in Africa; (vi)
agglomeration has a strong positive impact on FDI inows to Africa; (vii)
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huge FDI into Africa; (viii) East and Southern African sub-regions appear
positively disposed to obtain higher levels of inward FDI.
These empirical ndings have important key policy implications for African
countries. First, an important contribution of this paper relates to the
nding that FDI ows more to African countries that receive foreign aid.
Indeed, although the literature on the eects of foreign aid and the causes
and eects of FDI is vast, little or no empirical work has been done on the
eect of foreign aid on FDI inows to Africa. A good reason for this is the
positive \infrastructure eect" by which aid improves African countries'
economic and social infrastructure and hence raising the marginal product
of capital in those countries. However, this foreign aid eects may depend
on other factors, such as economic and social conditions of the recipient
African countries, and modality and volatility of foreign aid. It is therefore
important that African country-recipients of aid formulate policies that
improve their economic relationships with the donor countries in order to
attract higher FDI inows from the MNCs located in those countries. In
addition, in a context of growing shortage of foreign aid given the eect of
the recent nancial and economic crisis as well as the current Euro-debt cri-
sis, a detailed analysis of the aid-FDI nexus in the development cooperation
relationship is indeed an enriching and useful exercise.
Second, another important nding is that FDI is negatively correlated
with nancial development, which indicates that FDI is a substitute of do-
mestic nancial market development in Africa. Thus, low nancial sector
development is a strong predictor of FDI inows to African countries. How-
ever, in order for FDI to complement local nancial development, African
countries should improve the quality of domestic nancial systems (includ-
ing integrating them into global nancial markets) to make the economies
more attractive to MNCs to invest in them.
Third, enhanced regional cooperation and integration will also increase
market size in Africa and help attract investors currently constrained in
part by the small size of some domestic African markets. This is all the
more important given our nding that large market size attracts FDI to
Africa.
Fourth, an export-oriented regime opens up the economy of a nation
to the outside world especially in terms of increase in demand, which is
necessary for a higher return of investment to be achieved by investors.
However, Africa's international development partners should continue to
facilitate the establishment of a more open and equitable trade regime.
Countries that have diversied their exports suer from problems of quality
and lack knowledge of export markets and appropriate technology. African460 JOHN C. ANYANWU
TABLE 6.
First-Stage IV-GMM Estimates for Foreign Aid Using Lagged Independent Variables
Variable Coecient
Instruments Second Lag of aid (% of GDP) 0.398
(6:25
)
Fourth Lag of aid (% of GDP) 0.182
(3:20
)
Included exogenous variables Urban Population Share 1 0.024
(0.25)














Human Capital 1  0:365
( 3:59
)




Control of Corruption 1 0.112
(1.44)
Regulatory Quality 1  0:145
( 1:94
)

















Shea Partial R-Squared 0.4707
F-Statistics of excluded instruments 102.72
P-value 0.0000
Wu-Hausman F Test 0.44468
P-value 0.50554
Note:  = 1% signicant level;  = 5% signicant level;  = 10% signicant
level.
Source: Author's Estimations.WHY DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT GO WHERE IT GOES? 461
TABLE 7.
IV-GMM Estimates of the Factors That Make FDI Go Where They Do
in Africa Using Lagged Independent Variables
Variable Coecient
Instrumented Endogenous Variable Aid (% of GDP) 1 0.295
(2:27
)
Exogenous Regressors Urban Population Share 1 0.636
(2:61
)














Human Capital 1 0.167
(0.91)





Control of Corruption 1  0:245
( 1:56)
Regulatory Quality 1  0:044
( 0:029)

























Note:  = 1% signicant level;  = 5% signicant level;  = 10% signi-
cant level.
Source: Author's Estimations.462 JOHN C. ANYANWU
exporters of agricultural products suer from the high subsidies in devel-
oped countries exporting similar agricultural products. This is why the
quick conclusion of the Doha Development Round is essential.
Fifth, governance infrastructure and institutional quality, especially the
rule of law, not only attracts FDI to Africa, but also creates the condition-
s under which domestic MNCs emerge and invest abroad. It is therefore
imperative that Africa's development partners, particularly the multilat-
eral development banks such as the African Development Bank, step up
their assistance (nancial, knowledge, and capacity development) towards
the development and sustenance of good institutional quality in African
countries. This will be most eective when channeled through regional
initiatives and institutions such as NEPAD and regional economic commu-
nities (RECs).
Given that oil, gas and mineral resources are non-renewable resources,
it is vital to negotiate more benecial and transparent contracts with
oil/mining MNCs operating in Africa, and ensure that these companies
do not evade taxes. For greater returns to African countries in terms
of royalties, for example, the governments should engage in auctions for
oil/mineral rights. In this regard, international nancial institutions like
the African Development Bank have a critical role to play in helping these
countries acquire the much-needed capacity not only to negotiate benecial
contracts but also for eective management of natural resource revenues.WHY DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT GO WHERE IT GOES? 463
Appendix A: Denition of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Denition Source
FDI Log of net foreign direct investment World Bank, African
(% of GDP). Development Indicators 2009.
Urban Population Log of urban population World Bank, African
Share (% of total population) Development Indicators 2009.
GDP per capita Log of gross domestic product World Bank, African
per capita (US$) Development Indicators 2009.
Openness Log of trade (% of GDP) World Bank, African
Development Indicators 2009.
Financial development Log of domestic credit to the World Bank, African
private sector (% of GDP) Development Indicators 2009.
Ination Log of consumer prices (annual %) World Bank, African
Development Indicators 2009.
Exchange Rate Log of ocial exchange rate to World Bank, African
the US$, annual average. Development Indicators 2009.
Infrastructure Log of xed and mobile phone World Bank, African
subscribers (per 1,000 people) Development Indicators 2009.
Human Capital Log of secondary school enrolment. World Bank, African
Development Indicators 2009.
Aid Log of net foreign ocial developmenr World Bank, African
assistance (oda) (% of GDP). Development Indicators 2009.
GDP Growth Log of real GDP growth rate (%) World Bank, African
Development Indicators 2009.
FDI 1 First lag of net FDI(% of GDP) Author's transformation.
Control of Corruption Log of control of corruption World Bank, African
(percentile rank 0-100) Development Indicators 2009.
Regulatory Quality Log of regulatory quality World Bank, African
(percentile rank 0-100) Development Indicators 2009.
Rule of Law Log of rule of law (percentile rank 0-100) World Bank, African
Development Indicators 2009.
Natural Resources Oilexporters (Dummy variable Author's transformation based on
for net oil exporters) African Development Bank Database
Regional Dummies Central, East, North, Southern, Author's transformation.
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